An obstacle to the widespread adoption of environmentally friendly energy technologies such as stationary and mobile fuel cells is their high upfront costs. While much lower prices seem to be attainable in the future due to learning curve cost reductions that increase rapidly with the scale of diffusion of the technology, there is a chicken and egg problem, even when some consumers may be willing to pay more for green technologies. Drawing on recent percolation models of diffusion by Solomon et al. [7] , Frenken et al. [8] and Höhnisch et al.
I. Introduction
The diffusion of new technologies often depends upon the interrelations between social and technical aspects [1] . On the one hand, communication channels and social networks play a central role in the widespread adoption of innovation [2] . Information contagion and imitation effects are widely recognized as crucial factors in the process of diffusion of innovations. In the particular case of energy technologies, and especially in the case of hydrogen and fuel cells technologies, demonstration effects and increased confidence play a significant role. On the other hand, technical factors such as the degree of complexity, compatibility and special features [3] directly influence the initial cost levels of innovations. High upfront costs are among the main factors that prevent the widespread diffusion of new technologies, and this is especially true for environmental energy technologies. The degree of learning economies is of primary importance in this context. New technologies characterized by high learning cost curve reductions will have a greater chance to break into mainstream markets. If a new technology has the chance to develop first in niche markets one could then exploit cost reductions in these markets due to learning curve effects when it is introduced into the mainstream market. For instance, in the case of environmentally friendly energy technologies, a potential niche for market entry might be created by the willingness of some particularly environmentally conscious and high-income consumers to pay more for products that are perceived to be green (an example is the Toyota Prius hybrid car in the US, called "Hollywood's latest politically correct status symbol" by the Washington Post 1 ).
However, even if much lower prices seem to be attainable in the future due to learning curve cost reductions that increase rapidly with the scale of diffusion of the technology, there is a chicken and egg problem. It is not clear when a technology will pass the threshold that permits widespread adoption and competitive market pricing, and when it will fail. The latter seems too often to be the case without long-term subsidies.
There exist a wide variety of policy options available to decision makers to influence this process. They may be roughly divided in two categories: demand-pull and technologypush policies. Even if a mix of the two is actually necessary, especially in the case of renewable energy sources [4] , we will analyze the effect of one particular policy option that belongs to the first category: adoption subsidies for consumers. According to Turkenburg [5] , the innovation diffusion process can be split into two parts: early deployment in which costs 6 decline, and widespread dissemination in which institutional barriers are overcome and investments increase. A potential policy strategy related to the first phase of diffusion is represented by temporary subsidies followed by a phasing-out policy during the period of pervasive diffusion. In practice, however, especially with regard to environmentally friendly energy technologies, we often find permanent subsidy policies because the diffusion of such innovations is frequently not self-sustainable. Thus one can ask what policy actions may be implemented to support the diffusion of a new energy technology to market maturity that are socially profitable? In other words, which kinds of subsidy policies can trigger a selfsustained diffusion of these particular technologies that ultimately justifies the upfront social expenditures?
Drawing on recent percolation models [6, 7, 8, 9] of diffusion, which combine the contagion aspect (e.g., epidemic models) with the heterogeneity of agent characteristics (e.g.,
Probit or heterogeneous threshold models), we develop and analyze a network model of new technology diffusion. Agents adopt when the price falls below their random reservation price drawn from a lognormal distribution, but only when one of their neighbors has already adopted. Combining with a learning curve for the price as a function of the cumulative number of adopters, this may lead to delayed adoption for a certain range of initial conditions.
Using agent-based simulations (ABS) we explore when a limited subsidy policy can trigger diffusion that would otherwise not happen. As a main result we find that subsidies are not helpful both when learning economies are too low (and thus reasonable temporary subsidies fail to trigger diffusion), and when learning economies are too high, (and diffusion would take-off anyway). However, for a certain range of learning coefficients a temporary subsidy policy may indeed trigger self-sustained diffusion provided that the level of subsidies is high enough.
The article is organized as follows. Section two gives a brief overview of the existing literature on percolation diffusion models, learning curves and subsidies. The details of the model and the methodology are discussed in section three. In section four we present the results. Interpretations and conclusions are discussed in section five.
II. Extending standard models of diffusion by introducing percolation, learning curves and subsidies
Innovation diffusion has been investigated using different approaches [10] . In particular, the S-shaped diffusion models and the epidemic models stem from two lines of research 7 originating in Griliches' empirical investigation [11] and Mansfield's contributions [12, 13] .
In general, diffusion models can be classified as epidemic models, Probit models, legitimation and competition models, and information cascades models [14] . In what follows we focus in the first two categories: epidemic and Probit models. While the former emphasizes the effects of information contagion, it usually presupposes agent homogeneity. The latter is especially relevant in stressing the effects of agent heterogeneity but it neglects a description of the interrelations among individuals. The percolation model developed in the present paper incorporates both information contagion and agent heterogeneity. Agents interact on a specific network structure called the Ising network [2] . According to Stauffer ). Percolation theory has been applied to social science [7] as well as to the economics of technology diffusion [8, 9] .
The process of diffusion of new products and technologies often occurs on different time scales. It often starts with a few early adopters, followed by an increasing cumulative number as time passes. Moreover, it often follows an S-shaped path of diffusion. The market price may have to fall below some threshold level, however, before this process of diffusion can take off.
Hohnisch et al. [9] have used percolation theory to explain what determines delayed take-offs in the diffusion of new products and what happens to the price's threshold level:
macroscopic effects either on the demand side or on the supply side or both can trigger the process of diffusion even for price levels initially higher than the threshold. What they call macroscopic effects may be interpreted as interdependency among potential buyers' choices on the one hand and learning curve cost reductions on the other. The notion of learning curves is well known in the literature [16] and refers to the unit cost reductions due to increasing 8 production. Thus costs and price decrease with the increasing number of new adopters. In [9] the model assumes that consumers' willingness to pay is drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1]. In order to incorporate consumers' aptitude to "greenness", we assume that the reservation price is distributed according to the highly skewed lognormal distribution such is characteristic of many other economic variables such as personal income and wealth.
We then develop a model that combines both the network effect and the heterogeneity of agents. While the present version adopts the lattice type network structure, in principle it can easily be generalized to other network topologies that better reflect the communication channels influencing consumer behavior at both the local and global levels.
The approach in [9] can be enriched by introducing policy actions intended to trigger widespread adoption of a new product such as subsidy policies. We modify their model in order to explore when subsidies may trigger the process of diffusion of eco-innovations. In particular, we investigate when diffusion can become self-sustaining after an initial policy of temporary subsidies. In the next section we specify the details of the model's structure and equations.
III. The Model
Consider a finite number of consumers distributed on a two-dimensional lattice with periodic boundary conditions (i.e., a torus). Each consumer is faced with the choice of whether of not to buy a new technology available in the market. Whether she will buy it depends on two factors: her neighbors' choices and her willingness to pay for that new product. She will first consider purchasing the product if it has already been bought by at least one of her neighbors.
If this condition is fulfilled she will then compare the market price of the new technology to her reservation price: she will buy it if the latter is higher than the former.
The model explains diffusion as a process of spreading news or "keeping up with the Jones's". This reflects the fact that the adoption of new products may often be the result of imitation behaviors (in the particular case of hydrogen and fuel cells technology, a testimony of reliability and safety may be fundamental). In part this may simply result from status considerations, but it may also be an essential element in reducing informational uncertainty about product characteristics and suitability. In addition, the model analyzes diffusion as resulting from the interaction of heterogeneous behaviors. Consumers' initial willingness to pay for the new product is drawn from a lognormal distribution at the beginning of the simulation. It might reasonably be argued that agents with a high income are characterized by 9 a higher reservation price (e.g. they are more inclined to pay for the environmental quality of a product).
A schematic representation of such a network neighborhood is presented in Figure 1 .
Consumer i is of type 0-she has not yet acquired the technology. Type 1 consumers such as the ones on the left and above have already adopted the technology in previous periods. She knows about the availability of the new product 2 (e.g. at least one of her neighbors has already bought it). Her reservation price is . In contrast to [9] , the only macro effect modeled in our analysis is represented by the learning curve. We do not assume that the consumers' reservation prices will decrease with the number of adopters. In the basic percolation model, percolation occurs when the probability that i θ is greater than the market price t p is less than the critical value c P (for a square lattice
). With a lognormal distribution, the integral of the density function at t p must be less than
. In that case product diffusion will take off. After the occurrence of percolation we know that a certain number of agents, depending on the path of diffusion of percolation, have bought the product. According to the Probit model, if the reservation price is log-normally distributed then the probability to buy
in the static case is:
where ( )
is the cumulative probability function at p, the market price of the new product. In the case with learning this leads to dynamic equations of the form: 
IV. Results and interpretation
The Direct subsidy policies by governments for eco-innovations are rare. An exception is the Japanese policy for promoting photovoltaic [17] . Often policy actions in favor of environmentally friendly technologies are a portfolio of different approaches implemented to encourage the emergence and the diffusion of the technology on both the supply and the demand sides. In the present paper we will only model direct subsidies to consumers. Adoption takes place entirely at a subsidized price level, but the level of diffusion is considerably higher than in the short-term subsidy case.
Whether a policy is a valuable option depends upon the desired level of diffusion. Let us take the Probit level of adoption as a benchmark. The new technology is adopted and diffuses widely even for initial price levels higher than the threshold ( 698 . 1 = p ). However, there exists a threshold level for the learning coefficient such that for α lower than this threshold diffusion does not take-off (e.g., it does not exceed the lower bound represented by the level of diffusion given by the Probit model without learning).
14 In Figure 9 , where the length of subsidies tMax is four simulation time steps effect when we switch from a medium-term to a long-term policy. However, the introduction of a subsidy policy is only sensible in conjunction with learning economies if the initial price is well above the percolation threshold.
We have seen that subsidies are only effective for learning parameters in a certain range (0.2-0.4). Subsidies on the demand side are in some sense dual to R&D expenditures on the supply side, which also serve to support developments efforts in a technology in the pre-commercial stage until the point where the technology "can stand on its own two feet". Empirical studies have shown that learning parameters of successful technologies are indeed, ex post, in this range [18] . This remarkable coincidence is perhaps not so surprising since only those technologies for which demand-side or R&D subsidies had been successful investments will show up in the statistics on learning curves as other technologies having been selected out.
V. Conclusions and Directions for Further Research
In this article we analyze the relationship between the diffusion of a new technology, we see a stronger effect when we switch from a medium-term to a long-term policy.
To more fully evaluate the appropriateness of subsidy policies it is necessary to formulate some kind of cost-benefit analysis to measure the returns to subsidized adoption in terms of additional environmental goods (foregone pollution, for example, due to a wider and earlier diffusion of an environmentally friendly technology) vs. the subsidy costs to the taxpayer. Our intuition says that there must be a "sweet spot" in parameter space and subsidy design space at which subsidies are maximally effective in triggering adoption and widespread diffusion without wasting money on adopters who would have adopted anyway. Because the system is so nonlinear, the existence of such a "sweet spot" seems likely, although whether policymakers could always find it in practice, given the uncertainties surrounding the learning parameter and consumers' propensities to adopt, remains to be seen. We are currently working on simulation experiments in this direction.
Additional realism would be added by allowing for a portfolio of new technologies to be present instead of the standard assumption of just one innovation competing against an incumbent. A simple modification of the present model could address this question by using a multinomial decision mechanism to model each adopter's choice. 
